Freud and Lacan: Diverging Paths in Psychoanalysis

“The psychoanalytic clinic consists in questioning everything Freud said. That is how I understand it, and that is how I put it into practice.” — Jacques Lacan (1977).

This statement, delivered by Jacques Lacan during the inauguration of the Clinical Section in Vincennes, encapsulates a fundamental tension at the heart of psychoanalysis: the necessity of interrogating its own foundations. While Lacan never abandoned Freud’s theoretical legacy, he insisted on a critical re-examination of its assumptions, methods, and implications. His assertion does not denote rejection but rather a structural reformulation, aimed at preserving what is subversive in Freud’s discovery while addressing the conceptual impasses and clinical limitations that emerged within post-Freudian developments.

Freud’s model, grounded in a biologically inflected theory of drives and developmental stages, has been both foundational and contested. It has drawn criticism for its deterministic framework, its normative assumptions about psychosexual development, and its conceptualization of the ego as an agent of adaptation and mastery. Feminist theory, post-structuralism, and clinical discourse have all problematized Freud’s notions of subjectivity, gender, and psychic health.

In contrast, Lacan offers a structural and linguistic reconfiguration of the Freudian field, rethinking the symptom not as a trace of repressed content but as a formation bound to the logic of signifiers and jouissance. Lacan displaces the emphasis from content to structure, from meaning to function. His critique of ego psychology, his rejection of adaptation as an analytic goal, and his insistence on the opacity of desire redefine both the aims and methods of psychoanalysis.

This theoretical divergence is not merely of academic interest; it has substantial consequences for clinical orientation. The analytic stance, the function of interpretation, the handling of transference, and the conception of the subject are all determined by these underlying frameworks. Moreover, contemporary psychoanalytic schools remain divided—implicitly or explicitly—along these lines. Understanding the distinctions between Freudian and Lacanian orientations is therefore indispensable for clinicians, scholars, and institutions seeking to situate their practice within the broader field of psychoanalysis.

The aim of this article is threefold: first, to delineate the central critiques of Freud’s theoretical model; second, to articulate Lacan’s response to these critiques through his return to Freud; and third, to reflect on the implications of these differences for psychoanalytic treatment and institutional discourse. In doing so, it will argue that Lacan’s intervention not only revitalizes the Freudian project but also secures the relevance of psychoanalysis in confronting the complexities of subjectivity in contemporary culture.

Freud’s Theoretical Framework and Its Criticisms

Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory emerged at the intersection of clinical observation, philosophical speculation, and biological science. His metapsychology was designed to explain the workings of the mind in terms of unconscious processes, psychic conflict, and developmental stages. Central to Freud’s model were concepts such as the unconscious, repression, the Oedipus complex, and the structural divisions of the psyche—id, ego, and superego². These conceptual tools provided a novel lens for understanding neurosis, symptom formation, and the role of fantasy and desire in psychic life.

One of Freud’s most influential contributions was his theory of infantile sexuality, culminating in the formulation of psychosexual stages (oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital). According to Freud, the resolution of the Oedipus complex—via repression and identification with the same-sex parent—was fundamental to the development of the mature ego and entry into normative heterosexuality. This model implied a teleological progression toward adaptation, control, and conformity with prevailing social norms.

Despite its innovation, Freud’s theory has been the subject of sustained critique from various quarters. Among the most notable criticisms are:

Normativity and Gender Bias: Freud’s theory of sexuality has been criticized for its phallocentrism and its marginalization of female subjectivity. Feminist theorists such as Juliet Mitchell and Luce Irigaray have argued that Freud’s model treats male development as normative and pathologizes forms of desire or identification that do not conform to heterosexual and patriarchal ideals.

Biological Determinism: Freud’s early reliance on a biologically driven model of instincts has been viewed as reductive. His dual-drive theory, Eros and Thanatos, has been critiqued for lacking empirical support and for framing psychic life in terms of fixed energetic mechanisms.

Ego Psychology and Adaptation: Later developments within Freudian psychoanalysis, especially in the American tradition of ego psychology (Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein), emphasized the ego’s adaptive functions and the goal of restoring or strengthening ego capacities. This shift has been criticized for aligning psychoanalysis with social conformity, reducing its subversive potential, and neglecting the unconscious dimension that Freud initially prioritized.

Limited Conceptualization of the Unconscious: While Freud’s discovery of the unconscious was revolutionary, his metapsychological writings sometimes oscillate between viewing the unconscious as a system of repressed content and as a dynamic force. Critics have noted that Freud did not fully theorize the structural and linguistic dimensions of unconscious formations, a task that would later be taken up by Lacan.

In addition to these theoretical concerns, empirical psychology has challenged Freud’s models for lacking falsifiability and scientific rigor. Although contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers often reject the demand for empirical validation in the terms posed by mainstream psychology, these critiques have shaped public and academic perceptions of Freud’s legacy.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize that many of these criticisms are not external dismissals, but internal tensions already present in Freud’s work. His writings, particularly Beyond the Pleasure Principle⁹ and The Ego and the Id¹⁰, demonstrate a growing recognition of the limitations of earlier conceptualizations, including the notion of the ego as a rational master and the idea of development as linear resolution. These internal contradictions open the space for Lacan’s return to Freud, a return that is not nostalgic but radically interrogative.

Lacan’s Return to Freud: Structure, Language, and the Invention of the Unconscious

Jacques Lacan’s project, often described as a “return to Freud”, constitutes a rigorous re-examination and re-articulation of Freudian psychoanalysis through the lenses of structural linguistics, logic, and topology. Far from a conservative restoration of Freudian doctrine, Lacan’s return aims to recover the subversive core of Freud’s discoveries while correcting what he perceived as distortions introduced by post-Freudian revisions, especially those of ego psychology. Central to this effort is a radical reframing of the unconscious: not as a hidden reservoir of repressed contents to be excavated, but as a formal structure governed by the laws of language.

Contrary to the prevailing belief that Freud discovered the unconscious as an objective entity, Lacan argued that Freud, in effect, invented the unconscious, as a mode of reading the subject’s relation to language, desire, and truth. Freud's discovery is not a discovery in the sense of an object found in the world, but an invention, a new way of listening, of relating to speech and the symptom. In this formulation, the unconscious does not pre-exist its analytic articulation; it emerges retroactively, through the analytic setting, as something that “insists” rather than exists.

Lacan’s statement that “the unconscious is structured like a language”, marks a decisive break from depth-based models of mind. Drawing on Saussurean linguistics and Roman Jakobson’s theories of metaphor and metonymy, Lacan conceptualizes unconscious formations, such as slips of the tongue, dreams, and symptoms, not as signs of buried meaning but as effects of a symbolic order that precedes and determines the subject. The unconscious, in this view, speaks through the signifier, and psychoanalysis becomes an operation on the symbolic.

Whereas Freud often oscillated between a topographical and dynamic view of the unconscious, Lacan insists on its structural status. The symptom is not a message in need of decoding but a knot in the signifying chain, a solution to an impasse in the subject's relation to jouissance. Interpretation, therefore, does not aim to restore ego coherence or uncover hidden truths but to intervene in the logic of the signifier to produce a shift in the subject’s position within discourse.

This structural reorientation has profound implications for clinical practice. For Lacan, the analyst is not a guide or interpreter in the traditional sense but a cause of the analysand’s speech. The analytic act involves creating the conditions under which the subject may encounter their divided status, as barred by language and alienated in the Other. The notion of subjectivity is no longer understood in terms of ego integration or developmental stages but as a split effect of the symbolic order, lacking any stable identity or final truth.

Lacan’s critique of adaptation is central to his break with ego psychology. While Freud already expressed skepticism toward adaptationist models, later Freudians placed increasing emphasis on the ego’s capacity to navigate reality. Lacan, by contrast, posits that the subject is constitutively misaligned with reality, caught in the structural non-relation between signifier and object. His infamous claim, “There is no such thing as a sexual relationship”⁵, underlines the impossibility of full symbolic mediation of desire and the irreducible failure inscribed at the heart of human relations.

By rethinking the Freudian field through the prism of language and logic, Lacan offers not merely a revision of psychoanalysis but a methodological rupture. His work addresses many of the enduring criticisms of Freud’s model, particularly its biological grounding, its normative developmental assumptions, and its ambiguous treatment of the unconscious, by proposing a formal, non-normative, and anti-adaptive conception of analytic practice. This, in turn, reorients the aims of treatment: not toward healing or normalization, but toward a traversal of fantasy and a reconfiguration of the subject’s relation to desire.

Clinical Implications and the Relevance of the Freudian–Lacanian Distinction for Psychoanalytic Schools

The divergence between Freud and Lacan is not limited to theory; it has direct and far-reaching consequences for clinical practice and the institutional orientation of psychoanalytic schools. Although both Freud and Lacan remain foundational figures in psychoanalysis, their conceptions of subjectivity, the unconscious, and the aims of treatment diverge in ways that shape not only how analysis is conducted, but also what is considered its core ethical function.

Freud’s clinical model evolved over time, but it retained certain assumptions that Lacan would later problematize. Central to Freud’s approach is the idea that the symptom represents a compromise formation, an expression of repressed desires and unresolved conflicts. Treatment, from this view, involves bringing unconscious content into consciousness through interpretation, facilitating insight and the resolution of internal conflicts. The goal, particularly in Freud’s later work, was to transform neurotic misery into common unhappiness, implying a trajectory toward adaptation and ego strengthening.

Lacan, however, critically interrogated this adaptive dimension of Freudian theory as it was taken up by ego psychology and institutionalized in the mid-20th century. He opposed the idea that analysis should aim at normalization or adjustment to reality. In Lacanian terms, the ego is itself a misrecognition (méconnaissance), formed in the mirror stage through an imaginary identification with an ideal image. To reinforce the ego is thus to deepen the subject’s alienation, not to resolve it. This position reorients the entire analytic aim: rather than striving for self-coherence, Lacanian analysis seeks to produce a shift in the subject’s relation to the signifier, and ultimately, a traversal of the fundamental fantasy that structures their suffering.

Moreover, Freud’s model, especially in its topographic and structural phases, presupposes a layered mind divided among id, ego, and superego, and often places the analyst in a position of interpretive authority. By contrast, Lacan insists on the non-totalizable nature of the subject, who is constituted by a lack and barred from full self-knowledge. The analyst, therefore, must avoid becoming an ego-ideal or interpretive master. Instead, Lacan proposes the use of strategic silence, equivocation, and the scansion (cutting of sessions) to disrupt the analysand’s speech and open access to unconscious formations.

This theoretical divergence is reflected in institutional differences. Freudian-influenced psychoanalytic schools, particularly those aligned with ego psychology and object relations theory, tend to focus on the development of the self, the repair of early attachment ruptures, and emotional regulation. In contrast, Lacanian-oriented schools emphasize the singularity of the subject’s relation to the signifier, the structural nature of symptoms, and the function of the analyst as a placeholder for the object cause of desire (objet petit a). These distinctions are not merely theoretical; they manifest in how sessions are structured, how the analyst intervenes, and how progress is conceptualized.

Understanding the distinction between Freudian and Lacanian orientations is essential for both clinicians and theorists. It clarifies why psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to a single method or worldview and why disagreements among schools are not merely technical, but ethical. Lacan’s contributions provide a coherent response to longstanding critiques of Freud’s work, particularly those centered on its biological leanings, normative assumptions, and ambiguous concept of cure, by reframing psychoanalysis as a logic of the speaking subject rather than a science of the mind. In this way, Lacan offers not a rejection of Freud, but a radicalization. As he himself stated, “The psychoanalytic clinic consists in questioning everything Freud said. That is how I understand it, and that is how I put it into practice.”⁷ This ethos remains vital for contemporary psychoanalytic praxis, reminding us that the field must continually interrogate its foundations if it is to remain responsive to the complexities of the speaking subject.

Conclusion: The Significance of Freud and Lacan’s Divergence in Psychoanalytic Practice

The clinical and theoretical contributions of Freud and Lacan to psychoanalysis remain foundational yet distinct, each offering unique insights into the nature of the unconscious, the subject, and the psychoanalytic process. Freud's model, rooted in the discovery of repressed material and the structure of the psyche, introduced a groundbreaking understanding of the unconscious as a repository of hidden desires. His therapeutic goals, focused on insight, symptom alleviation, and the strengthening of the ego, were crucial in shaping early psychoanalytic practice. However, Freud's theory also faced significant criticisms, particularly its reliance on biological determinism, its linear conception of development, and its emphasis on adaptation to societal norms.

Lacan’s radical return to Freud, while maintaining the emphasis on the unconscious, shifts the focus from uncovering repressed content to interpreting the unconscious as structured like language. Lacan’s theory of the divided subject, the role of the analyst as an object-cause of desire, and his understanding of symptoms as structural rather than causal offer a solution to the limitations of Freud’s more reductionist and developmental models. By foregrounding language and the symbolic order, Lacan addresses key criticisms of Freud’s model, particularly its reliance on the ego and normative structures of development.

The implications of this distinction are profound for psychoanalytic practice. Freud’s focus on interpretation and symptom relief remains influential in many clinical settings, but Lacan’s emphasis on the structural dimension of the unconscious and the non-totalizable nature of the subject offers a more dynamic, non-normative approach to treatment. Psychoanalytic schools today, whether Freudian, Lacanian, or integrative, must engage with these foundational differences to understand their clinical implications and the ethical dimensions of their work.

As psychoanalysis continues to evolve, the theoretical and clinical distinctions between Freud and Lacan offer critical insights into the subject’s relation to language, desire, and the unconscious.

The ongoing interrogation of psychoanalysis ensures that it remains a valid and evolving practice, responsive to the complexities of the human subject, and continues to offer a relevant form of treatment to bear the discontents of culture.